Small businesses occupy an iconic place in American public policy debates. This paper discusses interactions between the federal tax code, small business, and the economy. We summarize the characteristics of small businesses, identify the tax provisions that most affect small businesses, and review evidence on the impact of tax and other policies on entrepreneurial activity. We also examine evidence suggesting that it is young firms, not small ones, where job growth and innovation tend to occur. Policies that aim to stimulate young and innovative firms are likely to prove different than policies that subsidize small businesses.
I. Introduction
Small businesses occupy an iconic place in American public policy debates. Numerous and diverse public policies subsidize small businesses, and political leaders of both parties routinely voice their support for the sector. At least part of this support is based on the notion that a healthy small business sector leads to innovation, jobs, and a healthy overall economy.
Not surprisingly, however, the economic issues surrounding small businesses and innovation are more complex and nuanced than any iconic designation would suggest. At the core of these issues are the questions of whether and how public policies should subsidize small businesses. On the one hand, economic theory prescribes that well-designed tax and spending programs, in the absence of externalities or public goods, should be neutral among types of investments and forms of business organization, leaving a free market to allocate resources efficiently between small versus large business. On the other hand, small business owners may face special barriers to entry or to firm expansion and many people assert that the small business sector is our principal engine of jobs, growth, and innovation. Either or both of these situations might justify preferential treatment for the small business sector. Recent proposals by Representative Dave Camp (R-MI), the chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, address a number of issues regarding the tax treatment of partnerships and S corporations. 1 Against this backdrop, this paper aims to provide a clearer understanding of how the federal tax code affects small business. In section II, we provide background information on the small business sector, including alternative definitions of small businesses, the tax and income characteristics of small business owners, and the allocation of small businesses across different legal forms of business.
In section III, we examine evidence suggesting that being small, in and of itself, does not confer a special advantage to businesses in job creation or innovation. Rather it is in young firms, which by definition start as small businesses, where job growth and innovation tend to occur.
Focusing on young and innovative firms likely implies a different focus for policy interventions than focusing on small businesses per se.
Section IV describes various tax policies and other public programs that are aimed at helping small businesses. We document the panoply of existing tax incentives and the significant credit and lending programs that encourage small businesses to hire, expand, and innovate. At the same time, we note that when pro-small business subsidies or policies are phased out as firm size expands, they may unintentionally discourage businesses from expanding because expansion will lead to loss of those subsidies.
Section V analyzes the existing literature on the impact of tax policies on small business behavior, including entry, exit, duration of entrepreneurial firms; the impact on employment, investment, and firm growth; the effect on research and experimentation spending, which presumably leads to innovations; the effect on organizational form; and the effects of taxes on the financing of new ventures. Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. Background on the Small Business Sector

A. Defining small business
Despite the common use of the term "small business," there is no single all-encompassing definition of a small business. Alternative definitions exist in part for data reasons -no single data source has all of the relevant information -but also, importantly, for conceptual reasons.
Businesses can be defined as small as a function of their employment, assets, gross receipts or other characteristics, and for different policy purposes, different definitions may be most relevant.
Small Business Administration Definition
The Small Business Administration (SBA) was created by Congress in 1953 with the goal of supporting small businesses, broadly defined as those that are "independently owned and operated and which [are] SBA industry definitions of small businesses use either a firm's annual net receipts or its employment. To be eligible for SBA assistance and for contracts reserved for small businesses, firms must have income or employment below the SBA's threshold. In most industries other than manufacturing and mining, the "size standard" is $7 million in average annual net receipts for the 2 The broad definition of small businesses is provided in the Small Business Act of 1953.
previous three years. For many manufacturing and mining industries, the SBA uses employment for its size standard: in general, businesses can employ no more than 500 employees on average during the past twelve months to be considered small.
The SBA adjusts these standard definitions in several cases, depending on industry characteristics. For example, in some service and retail industries (including computer programming firms, architectural firms, grocery stores, and department stores), the SBA has increased the annual receipts threshold to $35.5 million. Similarly, employment thresholds can vary, too. Petroleum refineries and wireless communication carriers can employ as many as 1500 employees and still be considered small while merchant wholesalers can employ no more than 100 employees and still qualify.
Using a small business definition of 500 employees, the United States had 27.9 million small businesses in 2010. 3 About 6 million small businesses employed between 1 and 499 people (other than the owner). The remaining 22 million were non-employer firms (i. 
Definitions based on tax returns
A second common approach to identifying small businesses (and the characteristics of small business owners) is to use information from income tax returns. From a tax perspective, a small business can be organized as a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a limited liability company (LLC), an S corporation, or a C corporation. These alternative legal forms differ in their consequences for taxes, liability, and other factors.
Sole proprietorship refers to unincorporated businesses that are owned and run by a single individual. The owner receives all profits, and assumes all liabilities of the company. For sole proprietorships, net business income or loss is included in the owner's adjusted gross income reported on the individual income tax return and subject to individual income tax. Sole proprietors are also responsible for payroll tax on their profits from the business, in addition to any payroll tax they must remit for employees.
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Partnerships, LLCs and S corporations have more than one owner, and are collectively referred to as "pass-through" entities. Unlike C corporations described below, they do not pay a separate business-level tax on their profits. Instead, business profits and losses are allocated to owners, who add the profits to (subtract the losses from) income that is subject to individual income tax.
Partnerships are unincorporated businesses that have at least two owners. For tax purposes, partnerships are deemed to distribute all profits, losses and credits to their owners, where they are taxed as part of the partners' individual income. General partners are considered to be self-employed under the law and thus are liable for SECA taxes from partnership income, similar to sole proprietors. Distributions to limited partners, however, are subject to only income taxes, not payroll taxes.
An S corporation is a corporation that chooses to be subject to the regulations contained in Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. It is different from a C corporation in several respects: it cannot have more than 100 shareholders, it can only have one class of stock, and shareholders must be residents of the United States and cannot be a for-profit corporation or a partnership (trusts, estates, and non-profit corporations, however, are permissible).
An LLC (or limited liability company) is an unincorporated association that shares characteristics of both corporations (e.g. limited the financial liability for members) and partnerships (e.g. pass-through income taxation). LLCs by default are taxed as partnerships but they can choose to be taxed as sole proprietorships, S corporations, or C corporations; they also require less record keeping than a C or S corporation and can distribute income, losses, and credits according to an operating agreement, unlike an S corporation which must make distributions based on company ownership.
Like partnerships, LLCs and S corporations do not pay federal income tax as entities: the company's profit and losses and credits are passed along to owners and taxed as part of their individual income. Unlike most partnerships, the owners' allocated shares of profits from LLC's and S corporations are not automatically assumed to be subject to SECA taxes. Rather, distributions are similar to those made to limited partners (LP) in partnerships: since the LP provides capital and not labor (or at least not without a separate pay statement that would then be subject to SECA taxes), he or she is not liable for SECA taxes on his or her partnership distribution. 6 This creates an incentive for owner-employees to understate their wages, which are subject to income and payroll tax, and thereby overstate their profits, which are only subject to the owner-employee's income tax. To counter this, the IRS applies as a "reasonable wage" standard, which is the wage the owner-employee would be willing to accept for performing the same job function for another company. If the IRS determines that the wages are not reasonable, then it may categorize a distributed profit as a wage and assign a penalty to the owner-employee.
Subchapter C corporations are taxed according to the corporate rate structure ( Table 1 ).
The corporate tax applies graduated tax rates of 15, 25, and 34 percent on corporate taxable income (i.e. total receipts less cost of goods sold less allowable deductions) below $100,000. For taxable income between $100,000 and $335,000, the marginal rate increases to 39 percent, which recaptures the revenue lost from taxing the first $100,000 of income at15 and 25 percent instead of at 34 percent. By the time the corporation has earned $335,000 in taxable income, its average tax rate is 34 percent, which it maintains until $10 million in income. Between $10 million and $15 million, the marginal corporate tax rate is 35 percent. A 38 percent rate recaptures the revenue lost to the 34 percent corporate tax rate between $15 million and $18.3 million, above which the corporate tax rate is effectively a flat 35 percent.
A C corporation may choose to distribute profits to shareholders in the form of dividends, repurchase shares, or retain earnings to facilitate company growth. If dividends are distributed, they also face taxation at the shareholder level, creating a double-tax on corporate income. However, this double-tax is not completely negated if a C corporation decides to retain earnings: 6 The rules for LLC treatment of self-employment income are less well-defined than for S corporations and partnerships. Many tax practitioners assume that an LLC is less likely to be audited if its members follow the S corporation and partnership rules.
7 To help alleviate this burden, dividends were given a preferential rate of 15 percent in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (Pub.L. 108-27) . This lower rate was scheduled to expire in 2013, and dividends were to be taxed as ordinary income in 2013, but the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 made permanent a top tax rate of 20 percent for qualified dividends.
the signal of company growth should cause the price of company stock to rise. When the asset is sold, the gains would be subject to capital gains taxes. (income from S corporations), and Form 1120 (income from C corporations, whose total income or deductions are less than $10 million). They refine the definition of a business owner by requiring an individual tax return filer (a) to have at least $10,000 in business income or business deductions (or at least $15,000 in the sum of business income and deductions), and (b) to have at least $5,000 in wages and salaries, interest paid, the cost of goods and services bought from other firms, rents, and other business deductions. 9 And to restrict the analysis to owners of small businesses, they exclude income individuals receive from business with more than $10 million in the sum of gross receipts, rents and portfolio income or those with business deductions in excess of $10 million. Knittel et al. (2011) used receipts instead of employees as the small business threshold both because employment is not reported on tax forms and because many tax code provisions (see Section IV) for small businesses are based on gross receipts Using this methodology, Knittel et al. (2011) find that, of the 143 million tax filers in 2007, 44.3 million reported some type of business income. There were 42.4 million individuals had some type of flow-through income and 1.9 million C corporations ( Table 2 ). Almost half of these (45.4 percent) did not meet the dual test to qualify for business activity, resulting in an estimated population of 24.2 million business filers. Almost all (23.9 million) business filers qualified met the $10 million threshold to qualify for a small business: 45 percent were nonfarm, non-rental sole-proprietorships, 9 percent were partnerships, 14 percent were Subchapter S corporations, and 7 percent had income from small C corporations.
By industry, almost three out of ten small businesses were in the real estate and rental industry ( In contrast, the older definition based solely on Schedule C, E, and F provides an estimated population of 34.7 million owners (Table 4) . Filers with AGI less than $200,000
represented 92 percent of small business owners and only earned 24 percent of small business income (Table 5 ). Meanwhile, filers between $200,000 and $1 million accounted for 37 percent of small business income while representing only 7 percent of small business owners.
III. Small business, innovation, and job creation
There is a long-standing debate about the role played by small businesses in job creation in the United States. Indeed, policies to support small businesses are often justified based on the assumed effects of small businesses on the economy. What seems relatively clear is that most employers are small businesses and many employees work for small businesses. According to Small Business Administration's definition of small businesses, small businesses make up more than 99 percent of U.S. firms with employees and account for 49 percent of private sector employment (SBA 2012).
What is more controversial is the role of the small business sector as a force in net job creation. Birch (1979 Birch ( , 1981 Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) note three additional issues that muddy the relationship between firm size and employment growth. The first problem -called the size distribution fallacy --occurs when the study does not follow individual firms and instead looks at aggregate numbers. If, for instance, a firm decreases in size from large in the first period to small in the second, it will cause aggregate employment figures in the small firm category to increase in the second period, thus giving an appearance that small firms have grown in employment when they haven't. Using longitudinal data on individual businesses can address this problem.
The second problem arises from not distinguishing between net and gross job creation.
Net job creation is the difference between gross job gains and gross job losses. Davis et al. (1996) use the example of three firms, one small and two large. The two large firms offset each other -one with a 200-employee gain and the other with a loss of the same size --while the small firm hires 50 new people. In the example, the small business was responsible for all net job gains but only 20 percent of gross job gains.
The third problem is regression to the mean and arises from certain methodologies for determining business size. Birch (1979 Birch ( , 1981 Birch ( , 1987 classified firm sizes in the first period (basesizing), rather than in the latter period (end-sizing), and or as an average between the two periods (mean-sizing). Friedman (1992) shows that this is a common statistical error. Okolie (2004) shows that base-sizing, mean-sizing, and end-sizing can produce vastly different perspectives of net job flows. For example, suppose a firm had 250 employees in the first time period and added 10 BED data starts in the third quarter of 1992.
another 350 employees over the next three month period. Under a base-sizing methodology, the increase in employment would be attributed to small firms. Under an end-sizing methodology, however, the gross job gain would be attributed to large firms. 11 Viard and Roden (2009) 
and de
Rugy (2005) note that base-sizing overstates apparent job gains at small firms and biases the results in favor of the conclusion that small businesses contribute to employment growth.
The problem of base-sizing is further aggravated by the data's temporary fluctuations in size and its potential mismeasurement, which can create transitory spikes. If a large firm is temporarily reduced to a small firm classification due to a reduction in its workforce or statistical mismeasurement, it will show as small firm employment growth once the temporal anomaly has passed.
More recent and careful studies correct for these issues. Davis et al. (1996) used a longitudinal dataset of manufacturing plant-level data from 1972-88 and found that the inverse relationship between employment growth and firm size disappeared after correcting for the problems: large manufacturing plants and firms were responsible for most new jobs and most jobs lost in the sector. Although smaller plants had greater gross job creation rates, they also had high gross job destruction rates, yielding net job creation rates that were not significantly different from larger plants. Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2008) , however, tested this conclusion with a different longitudinal dataset, also correcting for the common data misinterpretations of prior studies.
Although they did find the existence of an inverse relationship for both manufacturing and service sectors, the magnitude was much smaller than Birch's estimates.
The most recent critique of the small business sector as key to employment growth is also the strongest. While attention typically focuses on "small" business in relation to job creation, it appears that the true driver of new jobs are young and innovative firms. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010) find, prior to adding age controls, an inverse relationship between firm size and net employment growth similar to Neumark et al. (2008) . However, the correlation disappears after controlling for firm age. The apparent inverse relationship between size and growth is due to the fact that nearly all young firms start small-that is, it is not "small-ness" that is driving net job creation, it is relative youth. Indeed, Haltiwanger et al. (2010) find that startups are responsible for about 20 percent of gross job creation; yet, young firms also have high gross job destruction rates; about 40 percent of the initial jobs created by startups are lost after five years by firm exit. If a young firm survives, though, it will tend to grow faster than its more mature small counterparts, who tend to be net job losers. Haltiwanger et al. (2010) suggest that this implies an "up or out" dynamic for small and young firms that is consistent with economic models of creative destruction in the marketplace; as a result, policies that focus on size without accounting for this dynamic are "likely to have limited success."
Hurst and Pugsley (2011) Hurst and Pugsley (2011) also provide evidence that most small businesses are not engines of innovation. First, using the Statistics of U.S. Businesses, they show that over twothirds of American small businesses can be grouped into just 40 industries. These industries are not generally considered technologically innovative; rather, they include businesses such as restaurants, small professional practices, skilled craftsmen, and shop keepers.
Second, they offer evidence from Kauffman Firm Survey showing that just 2.7 percent of small businesses in the survey had applied for patents and less than 6 percent of new firms applied for patents, trademarks, and copyrights during their first few years in existence.
Understanding that these measures may not be all-encompassing since firms may innovate and not patent their inventions, Hurst and Pugsley also reveal that less than 8 percent of new businesses reported they had developed any proprietary business practices or technology during their first few years of business.
IV. Public policies toward small businesses
Numerous public policies favor small business either directly or indirectly. In this section, we describe many of the major policies.
A. Tax policy for small business 13
Taxation of Sole Proprietorships and Pass-Throughs Relative to C Corporations.
The largest benefit that many small businesses receive through the tax code is being able to organize as a pass-through organization and avoiding the double taxation of corporate income. 14 The business income of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations are taxed at the individual level, and an LLC can choose whether its business income is taxed as a partnership, sole proprietorship, S corporation, or C corporation. About 93 percent of small businesses file as flow-through organizations: 45 percent of small businesses are sole proprietors or have rental or farming income; 14 percent file as S corporations; and 9 percent file as partnerships . 15 Burnham (2012) 
Expensing of Investment (IRC Section 179)
Normally, when a business purchases a piece of equipment, it must depreciate the cost of Since LLCs can choose to file as any of the organizational forms, Knittel et al. (2011) did not report them. 16 The latter limit is called the reduction in limitation and is an aggregate deduction maximum. A business can make as many Section 179 deductions in a single tax year and claim the full value of the deduction as long as the aggregate total does not exceed the reduction in limitation; above that threshold, the value of deduction is reduced dollar for dollar. A third limitation is the limitation based on income from trade or business, which says that the maximum total deduction cannot exceed the trade or business income for the individual or firm.
these limitations for 2012 and 2013. After 2013, the dollar limitation is scheduled to decrease to $25,000 and the reduction in limitation threshold will decrease to $200,000.
Given these limits, Section 179 is clearly intended to benefit small and medium-sized businesses. The Joint Committee on Taxation (2013) estimates that extending the increased thresholds of Section 179 in ATRA will cost about $8.1 billion in revenue for 2013.
Cash-Basis Accounting
The Internal Revenue Code requires companies to compute their taxable income via the same method by which they maintain their accounting books as long as the method is consistent in how it treats income and deductions across years. Although the IRS permits many methods, private sector firms most often use one of two: the cash-basis method and the accrual method.
Cash-basis accounting treats transactions as income when income is actually received and expenses as deductions when they are paid. Accrual accounting, however, counts a transaction as income when the firm has a legal right to the income or as an expense when the firm becomes legally liable for it, whether the income has been received or the expense actually paid.
The IRS generally requires accrual accounting for C corporations and for most other firms when inventory is necessary for operation of the business. Business size based on receipts, however, provides an exception; sole proprietors, partnerships, S corporations, C corporations with gross receipts averaging $5 million or less in the three previous tax years may use the cash method of accounting. In general, the cash-basis method is easier to administer and therefore lowers the compliance burden for these small businesses. Furthermore, if a sole proprietor, partnership, or S corporation averaged $1 million or less in annual gross receipts in the three previous tax years, it may also use cash-basis accounting to report purchases and sales of inventory items, which is not allowed for C corporations. The JCT (2012) estimates the cost of this tax expenditure for individual filers to be $1.1 billion in 2013.
Exemption from the Corporate AMT
The corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT) was created in 1986 to ensure that profitable corporations pay at least some federal income tax. The AMT applies a lower marginal rate of 20 percent to a base that includes fewer tax preferences in a parallel calculation to the regular corporate tax code; corporations must use the calculation that generates the larger tax liability and most business tax credits cannot be used to reduce corporate AMT tax liability.
The Taxpayer start-up costs exceed $50,000, which makes this especially beneficial to small firms. Large startups, however, must capitalize these cost into the asset price of the business, which can only be recouped when the business is sold. 18 Businesses that incurred these costs on or before October 22, 2004, were allowed to deduct the costs in equal annual amounts over five years.
Tax Incentives for Private Equity Investment in Small Firms
The tax code also includes a number of provisions to encourage investment in start-up small firms. Section 1044 allows taxpayers to roll over any capital gains tax-free on the sale of 17 The JCT specifically does not include the exemption as a tax expenditure because "the effects of the AMT exceptions are already included in the estimates of related tax expenditures" (JCT 2012). Even if the JCT did a tax expenditure estimate, the exemption may not exceed the $50 million de minimus requirement for JCT to report the cost of the tax expenditure.
publicly traded securities so long as the proceeds from the sale are used to purchase stock in specialized small business investment companies (SSBICs). 
Other Small Business Tax Incentives
IRC Section 45E helps qualified small firms pay for the start-up costs of setting up employees in new retirement plans. The credit is equivalent to 50 percent of the first $1,000 in eligible costs incurred each of the first three years of a qualified pension (which can be a defined benefit or defined contribution plan). Firms with fewer than 100 employees are eligible to claim 19 SSBICs are like SBICs (see Section IV.A.) except that they must invest in small firms that are owned by economically or socially disadvantaged individuals. 20 Only certain stocks meet the definition of a qualified small business stock. First, it must have been issued after August 10, 1993 and acquired at its original issue, either from the corporation directly or from an underwriter. Second, the business must be a domestic C corporation with less than $50 million in gross assets. Third, a supermajority of the corporations assets (80 percent) must be used for active business. Small firm in many commercial activities (e.g. law, architecture, health care, etc.) are not eligible for the partial exclusion.
21 Eligible stocks were issued after November 6, 1978 by a small business corporation, which is defined as having less than $1 million in money and property when it issues stock. The stock cannot have been exchanged for other stocks or securities, and a loss cannot be recognized unless the corporation received less than half of its receipts from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and stock and security transactions during the five years preceding the loss (IRC §1244(c)(1)(C)).
the credit, as long as employees received at least $5,000 in compensation from the firm in the previous year.
IRC Section 44 allows qualifying small business -those with 30 or fewer employees and less than $1 million in gross receipts for the preceding tax year -to claim a credit for expenses used to make the business more accessible to disabled individuals by removing architectural and transportation barriers. The credit is equal to 50 percent of the amount of eligible expenditures above $250 and below $10,250. The JCT (2012) estimates the tax expenditure cost of this tax credit to be $100 million in 2013.
IRC Section 263A exempts businesses with average annual gross receipts of $10 million or less in the three previous tax years from the uniform capitalization rule (UNICAP). Most firms that produce or trade merchandise must maintain inventories to determine the cost of goods sold -that is, the sum of the inventory at the beginning of the year and inventory purchased during the year less the inventory at the end of the year. Labor and material used to produce or purchase new inventory must be capitalized into the value of the inventory, and any allocable indirect costs are also capitalized. Small businesses, however, are exempt from these expensive administrative costs. The cost of this tax exemption is not known.
Tax Compliance and Tax Evasion
Along with the tax subsidies aimed at small businesses, the role of compliance and evasion among small business are also relevant to understanding the impact of federal taxes on the small business sector. The burden of complying with the tax system is significant. The IRS estimates that owners of small businesses (defined as less than $10 million in assets) spent The compliance burden -including the accounting and paper work costs of filling out tax forms -is larger relative to business size for small businesses than large ones (Slemrod and Venkatesh 2004) . DeLuca et al (2007) , using an estimate of small business owners' time of $25 per hour, estimate that compliance costs fall from around 150 percent of gross receipts for firms with gross receipts lower than $10,000, to around 10 percent for those between $50,000 and $100,000, and fall to 0.3 percent for firms with receipts over $1 million. 
Small businesses account for a large share of tax evasion in the United
B. Other tax provisions that affect entrepreneurs and innovation
It is worth noting that some tax policies favor large businesses, including specialized tax breaks like oil depreciation allowances. These targeted breaks for large companies offset some of the relative subsidization of small businesses. In addition, at least two important tax provisions have significant effect of entrepreneurship and innovation, even if they are not targeted toward small or young companies.
Research and Experimentation Tax Incentives
The research and experimentation credit (IRC Section 41) was introduced in the Section 199, the qualified production activities income (QPAI ) deduction, allows manufacturers to deduct up to 9 percent of domestic production gross receipts in excess of the cost of the goods sold and other expenses, losses, and deductions that are attributable to those receipts. Domestic production gross receipts are any receipts that are derived from selling, renting, or leasing (or otherwise disposing) of property that was produced, extracted, or grown 3) process of experimentation (one or more alternatives must be attempted), and 4) technological in nature (must rely on principles of physical or biological sciences, engineering, or computer science).
predominantly in the United States. 24 Although it is not directly targeted at small businesses, section 199 does help small manufacturing firms.
The Section 199 deduction started at 3 percent in 2005 and 2006, increased to 6 percent through 2009, and was fully phased-in at current 9 percent in 2010. The deduction cannot exceed taxable income (or adjusted gross income for those filing as individuals). The OMB (2012) estimates that the QPAI will have a tax expenditure cost of $14.5 billion, a fourth of which was attributable to individual income taxes.
C. Other Public Policies Toward Small Business
Besides the tax provisions noted above, the federal government supports small business through numerous public policies and programs. The largest and most significant reside in the Small Business Administration, which acts as a "gap lender." Often small businesses have limited assets and a short credit history, which makes it difficult to obtain loans or revolving lines of credit from private lenders given normal credit standards. The SBA's 7(a) General Major exceptions include selling food or beverage produced at the establishment, transmitting electricity, natural gas, and potable water, and selling, leasing, or renting out land. Domestic production in Puerto Rico was allowed in ATRA for 2012 and 2013. IRC Section 199 was created in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 after a World Trade Organization ruled that the United States was explicitly subsidizing exports by excluding foreign trade income from taxable income. The Congress repealed the foreign trade income exclusion and created the QPAI deduction, which encourages domestic production and implicitly subsidizes exports over imports since importers do not receive the same tax benefit; since it applies to domestic producers who do not export, it may not run afoul of WTO rules against export subsidies.
overall financing for the fixed asset with the borrower providing 10 percent and the primary lender the remainder.
The Microloan Program provides short terms loans of less than 6 year terms, business training, and technical training through nonprofit micro-lender intermediaries. The SBA lends money to micro-lenders, which is then lent to small businesses. Small business can borrow up to $50,000 for developing working capital and purchasing inventory, supplies, equipment, and furniture.
The Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) Program uses qualified private equity funds as intermediaries between the SBA and small businesses. Private equity funds receive SBA loan guarantees, which they use with their own capital to finance equity capital, long-term loans, and management assistance in small businesses.
The SBA also helps small businesses obtain business opportunities from the federal government. By law, 23 percent of federal contracting must go to small businesses (SBA 2012).
The SBA works with each federal agency to improve the opportunities for small business contracts.
Other federal agencies and departments also support small businesses. 
V. Effects of public policies on small business and innovation
This section reviews the impact of public policies --in particular tax policies -on the behavior of small businesses across a variety of dimensions, including innovation.
A. Entrepreneurial Entry, Exit, and Duration
The most fundamental choice for a potential entrepreneur is whether to enter the business sector in the first place. Bruce (2000 Bruce ( , 2002 argues that if the key decision is whether to enter (or leave) self-employment, the relevant tax variables to consider relate to the average tax rate in each option. If the decision examined is whether to expand or contract one's hours associated with self-employment, the relevant variables are the marginal tax rate in the two sectors.
Bruce (2000) examines the tax determinants of entry into self-employment using 1979-1990 data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). He restricts the sample to male heads of household between 25 and 54 who are in the wage-and-salary sector in the first observed period.
He defines the tax rate differential as the tax rate an individual would face in a wage and salary position minus the one faced in self-employment, and he applies this concept to create the average tax rate differential and the marginal tax rate differentials. Since the author can only observe the actual wage-and-salary or self-employment earnings and tax rate for each individual for each year, depending on the sector, he estimates the individual's earnings and tax rate in the alternative sector for each year using regression analysis.
He finds that an increase in the average tax rate differential of 5 percentage points raises the probability of transitioning to self-employment in a given year by 0.4 percentage points. This implies that facing a lower average tax rate in the self-employment sector relative to the wage and salary sector will induce people to move into self-employment. However, the 0.4 percentage point effect is small compared to the sample average transition to self-employment probability of 3.3 percent per year.
In contrast to the average tax rate results, Bruce shows that increasing the marginal tax rate (MTR) differential by 5 percentage points reduces the average transition into selfemployment by 2.4 percentage points. This implies that individuals facing a lower MTR in selfemployment than in the wage and salary sector are less likely to transition to self-employment.
The MTR effect is quite large relative to a base transition probability of 3.3 percent per year.
While the direction of the effect may seem counter-intuitive at first, the conclusion is consistent with a view that people move to self-employment in part because business ownership may provide opportunities to avoid or evade taxes. Gentry and Hubbard (2003) also examine the impact of tax policy on entry into selfemployment. Using PSID data from 1979 to 1993, and focusing on heads of households between the ages of 18 and 60, they estimate the determinants of entry into self-employment, focusing on the marginal tax rate level, as well as the convexity of the tax code -which they define as the difference between the average marginal tax rate faced by a successful self-employed individual minus the average MTR faced by an unsuccessful one. 25 The authors also control for individuals' education, earnings potential as an employee, and demographic characteristics, as well as timespecific macroeconomic factors. 25 To construct these tax rate estimates, they simulate the income of hypothetical successful and failed entrepreneurs for each sample member by assigning various probabilities of success to self-employed individuals and multiplying it by their wage income. For instance, they consider four possible "successful" entry outcomes in which the individual's labor income increases by 25, 50, 100, or 200 percent; each of these scenarios are assigned different probabilities; the marginal tax rate is calculated in each scenario; and an average marginal tax rate is calculated. The same approach is created for "unsuccessful" outcomes, with labor income falling by 10, 25, 50, and 75 percent in the different scenario. Gentry and Hubbard (2003) find that higher marginal tax rates in self-employment have a negative impact on entry into self-employment, but this effect is not statistically significant.
They find that higher average tax rates in self-employment raise entry into self-employment.
They also show that tax code convexity reduces entry into self-employment. They estimate that a five-percentage point increase in the spread between the MTR on successful and failed projects reduces the probability of entry in a given year by 0.67 percentage points, from a baseline probability of entry of 3.26 percent. Similar results apply for increases in the spread between the ATR on successful and failed projects. Their results imply that the tax code imposes a "success" tax, since the government claims a larger share of payoffs for successful entrepreneurs. expand on this work by looking not just at self-employment transitions in general, but examining entry to particularly innovative new industries or occupations. 26 They show that the entry rate into innovative occupations and industries is lower than in the overall self-employment sector. They find that higher marginal tax rates and a more convex tax system reduce entry into self-employment for people who were previously employed in innovative industries and occupations.
Cullen and Gordon (2007) present a theoretical examination of the effects of the tax code on an individual's decision move to the entrepreneurial sector. 27 For a high-income, risk-neutral investor, a graduated tax rates discourages entrepreneurial activity, since it taxes gains more than it subsidizes losses, while the payroll tax phase-out creates a subsidy to risk-taking by making the tax schedule less convex. For risk-averse individuals, a progressive tax structure can generate more entrepreneurial activity and risk-taking, since progressive taxes provide a form of insurance by imposing lower average tax rates when income is low and higher average tax rates when income is high. For risk-neutral or risk-seeking individuals, however, progressive taxation (with less than full offset) will reduce entrepreneurial activity.
While the studies above examine the determinants of entry into small and innovative businesses, Bruce (2002) examines the determinants of exit from self-employment. He uses PSID data from 1979 to 1990 and confines the analysis to male heads of households between 25
and 54 that are self-employed. Bruce finds that entrepreneurs with higher expected ATRs in selfemployment (holding wage and salary ATR constant) are less likely to exit self-employment. For instance, a 1 percent increase in the self-employment ATR would reduce the self-employment exit rate from 14.6 percent to 14.0 percent in annual data -this finding differs from Bruce (2000). Bruce's analysis on the marginal tax rate effects, however, is consistent with his earlier work, since he finds that, for example, a 1 percent increase in the self-employment MTR reduces the probability of exit from 14.6 percent to 5.9 percent. This result may be explained either by a tax avoidance or evasion argument or by the fact that higher tax rates act as insurance against fluctuating income.
In a related paper, Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2007) examine the duration of entrepreneurial spells, using panel data from 1979 to 1990 that includes over 200,000 tax returns.
Entrepreneurial exit is marked as having entrepreneurial activity in one year but not in the following one, where entrepreneurial activity is defined by having schedule C income (sole proprietorship), income from partnerships or royalty and rental income. The average length of entrepreneurial spells in their data is 3-4 years. The authors observe the tax rate for individuals in each sector (wage and entrepreneurial) and use TAXSIM to estimate the tax rate they would have faced in the alternative sector. They find that a 1 percentage point decline in the marginal tax rate on wage income reduces entrepreneurship spells by 16.1 percent for single filers and 12.7 percent for married ones, while a similar cut in the MTR on business income increases spells by 32.5 percent and 44.8 percent for single and married filers, respectively. Given these results, an across-the-board cut in tax rates would have a net positive impact on entrepreneurial spell length.
B. Financing of Start-Ups
Financing is a crucial consideration for any business, but especially for start-ups. The unique circumstances of start-ups often distinguish their financing from that of more traditional firms. Since startups typically have few assets and are not profitable for the first years of their existence, the traditional model of debt financing is rarely available (Denis 2004) . Furthermore, entrepreneurs bear an enormous amount of risk, at least until an IPO occurs or the company is acquired (Hall and Woodward 2010) . There is substantial evidence that many start-ups face borrowing constraints (see, for example, Evans and Jovanovic 1989 and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen 1994) . Still, the notion that "opaque start-ups" are left to starve for financing on a diet of the owner's credit cards and friends' and family's largesse is a "myth from the classroom" (Robinson 2012) .
Using data from the Kauffman firm survey, Robinson (2012) and Robb and Robinson (2012) Tax policy affects financing issues in two principal ways -the tax deduction for interest payments, which is a normal operating part of the income tax, and the preferential rate on capital gains, which affects venture capital. In principle, taxes can affect both the supply and demand for venture capital. In practice, the evidence seems to suggest that supply effects are weak but demand effects are present. Poterba (1989) shows that most suppliers of venture capital are not even affected by changes in the individual income tax treatment of capital gains, interest and dividends. Likewise, Gompers and Lerner (1999) show that venture capital commitments by taxable and tax-exempt investors are roughly equally responsive to changes in capital gains tax rates, a trend that would not occur if the supply of venture capital funds were tax-sensitive.
However, both Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that the demand for venture 28 For example, see CBO Insights, Venture Capital Activity Report, Q3 2012 and Fenwick & West, "2011 Seed Financing Survey," March 2012 capital among entrepreneurs increases with reductions in capital gains tax rates, as compensation via corporate stock can be substituted for wage and salary compensation.
C. Employment, Investment, and Firm Size Holtz-Eakin (1995) argues that subsidies of small businesses through the tax code (and by inference other public policies) effectively constitute a tax on growth since the preferential treatment phases out and is eventually eliminated as a firm yields more revenue or hires more employees -that is, subsidies to encourage small business entry may actually discourage their growth. Carroll, et. al (1998a Carroll, et. al ( , 1998b Carroll, et. al ( , and 2000 analyze the effects of the Tax Thus, one has to appeal to a cash flow model to explain the results --that is, lowering tax rates increases the entrepreneur's cash flow and allows them to hire more workers. The studies noted above focus on all firms. Since small firms claim just a small portion of the credit -for example, in 2008, firms with less than $1,000,000 in assets claimed just 1.8 percent of the credit -it is difficult to gather data to evaluate the effect of the credit on such firms. This is in part due to the fact that the R&D credit is non-refundable, which means that firms that do not have taxable income (mostly small and/or young firms) are not eligible for the credit. Nonetheless, Park (2011) shows that small firms spend a higher fraction of their revenue on R&E than large firms. Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) estimate that, in the Netherlands, the R&E tax credit encouraged R&E spending, with a 10 percent decrease in the user cost of R&E increasing the long-run R&E stock by 4.6 percent. The authors find larger elasticities for smaller firms than for larger firms, and hypothesize that the credit plays a major role in helping small firms in increasing their R&E expenditures because of capital constraints that limit their ability to invest in resources they deem necessary.
There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of the SBIR program. Lerner (1996) examines the impact of SBIR on employment and sales growth in a set of 1135 firms. He However, as Goolsbee (1998) points out, almost all of their variation is due to changes in the personal income tax, and responsiveness to changes in corporate taxes could differ.
Goolsbee (1998) examines this question looking at data from 1900 to 1939. Although this information is more dated than Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997) , and has the implications that some organizational forms that exist today (e.g., S corporations) did not exist in the sample 29 For a comprehensive discussion of related background issues, see JCT (2008) .
period, his analysis has the advantage of exploring a time period that contains more variation in the corporate tax rate, relative to the personal income tax rate on dividends and capital gains.
His results, nevertheless, suggest that corporate income taxes have only a small impact on organizational form choices.
Two papers examine the impact of the 1986 tax reform act on organizational form choices. Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990) examine the effects of the 1986 tax reform on organizational choice. The 1986 act significantly reduced the top tax rate on corporate income as well as individual income, and closed loopholes in the treatment of business income and both the corporate and non-corporate sector. The authors argue that the changes in taxation induced by TRA 1986 were complex and that, depending on a firm's circumstances, the changes might lead to a preference for corporate or non-corporate status. Nevertheless, they do find the notable empirical patterns that loss operations tended to shift to the corporate sector after 1986 and gains tended to shift to the non-corporate sector.
Carroll and Joulfaian (1997) use a panel of corporate tax returns from 1985 to 1990 to estimate the impact of the 1986 tax reform act on organizational form. They find that increases in the tax differential between corporate and non-corporate businesses will raise the probability that a C corporation converts to S corporation status, and they show that the tax savings are largest for the most profitable firms.
Two papers have used state-level variation in taxes. Goolsbee (2004) uses cross-sectional state-level data to estimate the sensitivity of organizational form to tax parameters. The evidence shows that increasing the differential between corporate and non-corporate activity raises the sales, employment and number of firms accounted for by non-corporate entities. One possible concern with cross-sectional data exploiting state-level variation in tax rules is that the results could be capturing other state-specific effects and mislabeling them as tax effects. However, Luna and Murray (2010) use panel-level data from the states and document a similar sensitivity.
30
VI. Conclusion
Federal policies tend to favor and support small businesses over larger enterprises, including tax incentives and programs operated or administered by the Small Business 30 Edmark and Gordon (2012) find a similar sensitivity of organizational form choices using data from Sweden.
Administration. The support is founded on the notion that small businesses are integral to the U.S. economy, job growth, and innovation; yet the evidence is mixed about the efficacy of this support: studies have started to question whether the size of a firm or its age is the correct variable to analyze.
Our primary conclusions run along two dimensions. First, in terms of policy, it is crucial for policy makers, the media and the public to understand that issues regarding innovation and entrepreneurship are conceptually distinct from issues regarding small businesses. Second, in terms of research, more is needed to understand the distinctions of small business versus entrepreneurial business and to understand the impact of taxes and other policies, on start-up, financing, investment, and organizational form of entrepreneurial enterprises. The literature on small business entry and exit provides, at best, mixed evidence as to what extent tax policy influences an individual's entry into or exit from entrepreneurship. The impact of public policies on innovation is even less well understood. As information has become more available and as tax policy has changed dramatically in the past quarter-century, further analysis would appear to be very profitable for understanding the small business sector, the entrepreneurial sector, the role of innovation, and the appropriate stance of federal policy. 
